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Abstract 
We overcome the problems of data availability and investigate the fiscal multipliers in autonomous 
prefectures in China.  We first estimate the long-run elasticity of gross regional production with 
respect to fiscal expenditure in autonomous prefectures, using autoregressive distributed lag models.  
The estimated long-run elasticity is much less than unity, however, and the estimated fiscal 
multipliers for prefectures are between 0.61 and 4.93, with an average of 1.93.  These results 
indicate that additional fiscal expenditure is still effective in increasing local income and promoting 
economic growth for most of the autonomous prefectures. 
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1. Introduction 
There are 56 nationalities in the People’s Republic of China, with the Han ethnicity 
accounting for more than 90% of the population; the remaining population constitute ethnic 
minorities.  A national minority regional autonomy system is practiced in places where ethnic 
minorities gather and live.  These autonomous areas are classified into top three levels of the 
national administrative divisions: five provinces, 30 prefectures and third level 117 counties and 3 
banners.  Gustafsson and Shi (2001) and Gustafsson and Sai (2009) estimate the income gaps 
between ethnic areas and the areas where the Han ethnicity is in the majority; the former authors 
investigate at the provincial level and the latter at the village level.  Kajitani and Hoshino (2009) 
also investigate the gaps in per capita gross regional product (GRP) and the disposable income of 
ethnic regions between provinces and within provinces (prefectural level).  They point out that the 
income inequality between provinces is smaller than that within provinces (between prefectures). 
In this paper, we focus on the autonomous prefectures.  These prefectures account for 
only 4.2% of the population but 24.8% of the area of the country.  Geographically, there is one such 
prefecture in the Eastern Region, two in the Central Region and the other 27 are in the Western 
Region.  Of course, the Western Region has focused on “Western Development” since 2000 and the 
Law of Promoting Western Development was enacted in 2004.  Construction of a “Harmonious 
Society” and boosting domestic demand, which are recent political issues in China, also focus on the 
autonomous prefectures not only by its cultural variations but also by their rich natural resources.  
However, these areas are still less developed and face several problems: poverty, environmental 
problems, and lack of educational infrastructure, health services and so on.  Therefore, the central 
government and provincial government provide fiscal subsidies to these prefectures to increase their 
fiscal expenditures.  To evaluate the effectiveness of this fiscal policy, we need to investigate the 
effects of fiscal expenditures on local income or production.  In other words, we should examine 
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the magnitude and significance of the fiscal multipliers. 
Several studies have examined the relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth 
in China.  For example, Batisse (2002) and Hsing and Hsien (2005) analyze national level 
economic growth and the effects of macroeconomic policies.  He, Zhang and Zhang (2009) and Liu 
(2009) estimate national-level fiscal multipliers.  Huang and Chen (2012) shed light on another side 
of fiscal policy.  They study intergovernmental transfer equalization effects.  Studies on fiscal 
expenditures themselves have also been carried out.  Chen (2013) and Yu and Tsui (2005) 
investigate the determinants of provincial-level local government size and prefectural- and 
county-level government expenditures, respectively.  Additionally, Zheng et al. (2013) point out 
that special and political factors are important in determining investment in regional infrastructure.  
However, there are no studies on the effects of subsidies from the central or provincial government 
to prefectural- or subprefectural-level governments and economies. 
We obtained our data from each autonomous prefecture’s Statistical Office.  We then 
investigate the fiscal multipliers in each autonomous prefecture.  We first estimate the long-run 
elasticity of fiscal expenditures with respect to GRP in autonomous prefectures, using an 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model.  The estimated long-run elasticity is considerably 
less than unity, however, and the prefecture-level multipliers are between 0.61 and 4.93, with an 
average of 1.93.  This result indicates that additional fiscal expenditure is effective in increasing 
local income and promoting economic growth for most of the autonomous prefectures. 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, we discuss recently used estimation 
methods for fiscal multipliers.  We then consider the limitations of the data for the autonomous 
prefectures and develop the ARDL model.  In Section 3, we present the estimation results and 
examine the fiscal multiplier for individual autonomous prefectures.  Lastly, in Section 4, we 
conclude the paper and discuss the remaining research issues. 
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2. Model for Estimating Fiscal Multipliers 
Recently, most of the studies on fiscal multipliers estimate time series models such as 
vector autoregressive (VAR) models or structural vector autoregressive (structural VAR) models and 
their impulse response functions.  For example, Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Végh (2013) estimate 
structural VAR models for 44 countries and estimated the impact multipliers and cumulative 
multipliers.  Their results show that the fiscal multipliers in industrial countries are larger than 
those in developing countries.  Tang, Liu and Cheung (2013) estimate time-varying VAR models 
for the ASEAN countries and find causal relationships from tax collections to GDP, whereas there is 
no significant causality from government expenditure to GDP.  Nijkamp and Poot (2004) conduct 
meta-analysis and conclude that government consumption multipliers are not significant, whereas 
those from government infrastructure spending are significant. 
For China, neither the simple VAR approach nor structural VAR approach has been used to 
examine fiscal multipliers.  Other approaches, however, have been use to estimate fiscal multipliers.  
For example, He, Zhang and Zhang (2005) estimate national-level short-run and medium-term fiscal 
multipliers using an input–output table and a DSGE model.  Their estimates of the short-run 
multipliers are between 0.80 and 0.84, but that of the medium-term multiplier is about 1.10.  Liu 
(2009) uses a Keynesian model and estimates fiscal multipliers at the national and provincial levels; 
those estimates are between 1.53 and 5.15. 
In this paper, we focus on the fiscal multipliers in autonomous prefectures in China.  We 
use data for 30 prefectures between 2005 and 2010 with some missing observations.  To estimate 
the effects of fiscal expenditures on gross regional products (GRP), we assume that fiscal 
expenditure is an exogenous variable in determining GRP.  Therefore, we pool the 30 prefectures 
and estimate an ARDL model with a dummy variable for each prefecture to control for the 
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idiosyncratic differences among prefectures. 
First, we set up the following ARDL model (note that the subscript i denotes individual 
autonomous prefectures and the subscript t denotes time), 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +∑𝛽𝑠𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝐾
𝑠=1
+∑𝛾𝑠𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝐾
𝑠=0
+∑𝛿𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑡−𝑠
𝐾
𝑠=0
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 
where Y  and G  are GRP and fiscal expenditure in each autonomous prefecture, respectively.  
Infl is the national-level inflation rate, which is calculated using the consumer price index for rural 
households from the 2012 Statistical Yearbook of China.  In this paper, because we have only six 
years of data, we set a maximum lag length K of two and select the model that minimizes Schwarz’s 
Bayesian information criterion (SBIC).  In the estimation, we transform the model to estimate the 
long-run effect of the autoregressive parameters and distributed lags as follows, 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
∗𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 +∑𝛽𝑠
+Δln𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝐾−1
𝑠=1
+ 𝛾∗𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 +∑𝛾𝑠
+Δln𝐺𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝐾−1
𝑠=1
+∑𝛿𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝐾
𝑠=0
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 
where Δln𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 = 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 − 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑠−1 and Δln𝐺𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 = 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 − 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑖,𝑡−𝑠−1.  In this model, Infl 
was not transformed because we do not need to estimate it long-run effect.  The relationships 
between the coefficients of the original model and transformed model are as follows, 
 
𝛽∗ = ∑ 𝛽𝑠
𝐾
𝑠=1  and  𝛽𝑠
+ = −∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=𝑠 . 
 
This transformation is also useful when we estimate the long-run elasticity of fiscal expenditure (ε) 
with respect to GRP; we can estimate it as follows, 
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ε = 𝛾
∗
(1 − 𝛽∗)⁄ . 
 
Of course, other economic variables may be candidates for explanatory variables.  For example, an 
international trade flow variable may be a candidate.  Poncet (2003) investigates the trade flows of 
Chinese provinces and Jiang (2011) points out the importance of openness for TFP growth at the 
provincial level.  However, we cannot access these data and autonomous prefectures are less 
connected to international trade systems, so we do not include these variables. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
Most of the data are provided by each autonomous prefecture’s Statistical Office: 
government expenditures and nominal GRP between 2005 and 2010 in each autonomous prefecture.  
Missing observations are fiscal expenditures for Ganzi Autonomous Prefecture in 2005 and those for 
Huangnan Autonomous Prefecture between 2005 and 2008.  The total number of observations is 
173 and we use 115 for estimation because we set the maximum lag length equal to two in the model 
selection process.  All the variables except the inflation rate are deflated by the national-level 
consumer price index for rural households, which is obtained from the 2012 Statistical Yearbook of 
China and the base year is 2005.  If local price indexes were available, we could pay attention to 
local price differentials and deflate the nominal data by these indexes.  For example, Brandt and 
Holts (2006) constructed local price index by the provincial level prices and consumption baskets in 
China.  However, as we cannot access the data to construct a price index for each prefecture, we 
adopt the national-level consumer price index for rural households as a proxy for prefectural prices.  
We use the index for rural households instead of that for urban areas because most autonomous 
prefectures are in rural areas.  As for the estimation method, we pool all the observations and apply 
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the least squares with dummy variables (LSDV) method.  This is a estimation method for panel 
data and its estimator is consistent estimator even when the assumptions that the estimator of the 
random effect model is efficient and consistent does not hold. 
We select the explanatory variables, apart from the dummy variables, for the LSDV 
method to minimize SBIC.  The estimated results are shown in Table 1.  We call the model before 
model selection the “Full model” and that after selection by SBIC the “Selected model by SBIC.”  
In the selected model, the variable Infl and its lagged values are omitted, and only lagged GRP and 
instantaneous fiscal expenditures are included as explanatory variables in addition to the prefecture 
dummy variables.  The estimated R-squared for the selected model is high at 0.9958 and diagnostic 
tests for missspecification (RESET), using squared and cubic fitted values as explanatory variables, 
are not significant.  Next, using this selected model, we investigate the effects of fiscal policy. 
The calculated elasticity of GRP with respect to fiscal expenditure is 0.497, which means 
that a 1% increase in fiscal expenditure increases GRP by about 0.5%.  To evaluate the effects of 
fiscal expenditures on GRP we use this elasticity to calculate the fiscal multiplier.  We can 
approximate the fiscal multiplier for each prefecture as, 
 
m = ε∙
Y
G
. 
 
This approximation is also used in Liu (2009).  Using averages of the ratios of GRP to fiscal 
expenditure for each prefecture during the sample period, we estimate the average fiscal multiplier 
for each prefecture in Table 2.  The estimated long-run elasticity of GRP with respect to fiscal 
expenditure is considerably less than unity, however, and the estimated fiscal multipliers for 
prefectures are between 0.61 and 4.93, with an average of 1.93.  Apart from six prefectures 
(Gannan, Linxia, Golog, Qizilsu, Ganzi and Aba) the other 24 prefectures have fiscal multipliers that 
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are larger than unity.  This result means that GRP increases by more than the associated increase in 
fiscal expenditure in most prefectures.  Compared with previous studies, the estimated fiscal 
multipliers are larger than those of He, Zhang and Zhang (2009) and marginally smaller than those 
of Liu (2009). 
 
4. Conclusion 
We estimated long-run fiscal multipliers for the autonomous prefectures in China, using an 
ARDL model with panel data.  The estimated long-run elasticity of GRP with respect to fiscal 
expenditure is less than unity, however, and the estimated fiscal multipliers for prefectures are 
between 0.61 and 4.93  Additionally, there are six prefectures whose fiscal multipliers are less than 
unity.  This result indicates that additional fiscal expenditure is effective in increasing GRP and 
promoting economic growth for most autonomous prefectures.  This result is also informative for 
reconsidering fiscal subsidies from central and provincial governments for autonomous prefectures 
in China because those subsidies increase the fiscal expenditures in autonomous prefectures.  In 
other words, the results shed new light on the effects of fiscal policy that have not been investigated 
previously because of data limitations. 
Finally, there are some remaining problems.  First, the coefficients of the model are 
constant across the 30 autonomous prefectures.  This assumption is somewhat restrictive because 
these 30 prefectures might face different natural and economic environments and their elasticity 
GRP with respect to fiscal expenditure might vary.  In such situations, we should estimate a 
separate model for each autonomous prefecture.  However, in this paper, we only have six years of 
data, so we had no choice but to apply the LSDV method to obtain stable estimates.  In the future, 
if suitable data are available, we will estimate separate prefectural models to obtain fiscal multipliers.  
Furthermore, to evaluate the size of the fiscal multipliers for the autonomous prefectures, they 
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should be compared across prefectures.  Furthermore, in considering subsidies for ethnic regions 
generally, we should focus not only on economic development but also on the conformability or 
happiness of residents, e.g., as investigated by Knight et al. (2009).  However, such a topic is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Table 1.  Estimation Results 
 Full model Selected model by SBIC 
Variables Coefficient/t-value Coefficient/t-value 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 .310091*/2.214 .481187** /6.334 
Δ𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 .076980/.731  
𝐺𝑖,𝑡 .248764*/2.513 .257662** /7.946 
Δ𝐺𝑖,𝑡 –.064820/–.677  
Δ𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 –.013492/–.434  
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑡 .00955741/.538  
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑡−1 .00226542/.207  
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑡−2 .023547/.661  
Constant & dummy variables Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 .9959 .9958 
S.E. .06546 .06645 
SBIC –84.892 –93.145 
Log likelihood 172.673 166.692 
RESET .901 .179 
Note: ** and * mean statistically significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
Total number of observations is 115. 
Log likelihood is reported from the results of the ML calculation in TSP 5.0. 
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Table 2.  Estimated Fiscal Multipliers 
 
Prefecture Nationality Region Province Estimated fiscal multiplier 
Yanbian Korean Northeast Jilin 1.96 
Gannan Tibetan Northwest Gansu 0.66 
Linxia Hui Northwest Gansu 0.93 
Yushu Tibetan Northwest Qinghai 1.29 
Hainan Tibetan Northwest Qinghai 4.21 
Huangnan Tibetan Northwest Qinghai 1.39 
Haibei Tibetan Northwest Qinghai 1.33 
Golog Tibetan Northwest Qinghai 0.63 
Haixi Mongolian & Tibetan Northwest Qinghai 4.02 
Bayingolin Mongolian Northwest Xinjiang 4.93 
Boertala Mongolian Northwest Xinjiang 2.35 
Qizilsu Qirghiz Northwest Xinjiang 0.61 
Changji Hui Northwest Xinjiang 3.67 
Ili Kazak Northwest Xinjiang 2.05 
Xiangxi Tujia & Miao Central Hunan 1.83 
Enshi Tujia & Miao Central Hubei 1.96 
Qiandongnan Miao & Dong Southwest Guizhou 1.45 
Qianxinan Buyi & Miao Southwest Guizhou 1.94 
Qiannan Buyi & Miao Southwest Guizhou 1.80 
Xishuangbanna Dai Southwest Yunnan 2.42 
Dehong Dai & Jingpo Southwest Yunnan 1.43 
Nujiang Lisu Southwest Yunnan 1.13 
Dali Bai Southwest Yunnan 2.43 
Diqing Tibetan Southwest Yunnan 1.14 
Honghe Hani & Yi Southwest Yunnan 2.40 
Wenshan Zhuang & Miao Southwest Yunnan 1.93 
Chuxiong Yi Southwest Yunnan 2.21 
Ganzi Tibetan Southwest Sichuan 0.72 
Aba Tibetan & Qiang Southwest Sichuan 0.80 
Liangshan Yi Southwest Sichuan 2.30 
 
